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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article places the latest series of attacks on Wiscon-
sin's medical malpractice dispute resolution system in proper
perspective. The Medical Society of Wisconsin and insurance
industry lobbyists would have the legislature believe that we
now face another medical malpractice crisis in Wisconsin. In
fact, the current alleged crisis merely represents a renewed ef-
fort on the part of the Medical Society and the insurance in-
dustry to continue the curtailment of the rights of malpractice
victims, begun in 1975, through the use of scare tactics and
misleading press releases and public pronouncements. All of
these assertions must be carefully analyzed before considering
further modifications in Wisconsin's medical malpractice law.
While this Article is not intended as a comprehensive re-
buttal of the attacks which are now being made by the Medi-
cal Society and insurance industry, it will demonstrate that
many of these attacks are without basis. In order to deter-
mine what is best for Wisconsin and before making any fur-
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ther modifications to our existing method of resolving
malpractice claims, the legislature should take testimony from
doctors, lawyers, economists, insurers, actuaries, consumers,
and victims of malpractice. We believe such a comprehensive
investigation will clearly demonstrate that there is no need to
modify the existing system of malpractice dispute resolution.
II. ISSUES AND PROPOSALS
The present challenge to Wisconsin's medical malpractice
dispute resolution system raises several issues that should be
examined. (1) Are doctors really paying greater medical mal-
practice premiums in real dollars than they did ten years ago?
(2) What percentage of a doctor's income is expended for
medical malpractice insurance? (3) Have unjustifiably low
medical malpractice premiums resulted in a deficit in the Pa-
tient's Compensation Fund? (4) From an actuarial stand-
point, is the Patient's Compensation Fund administrator
properly taking into account panel awards? (5) To what ex-
tent is the deficit in the Patient's Compensation Fund a result
of the failure of the Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner to
surcharge doctors who have, through their malpractice, re-
peatedly caused losses to the fund? (6) What has the Medical
Society done to discipline doctors who have repeatedly com-
mitted acts of malpractice? (7) Is the present alleged Wiscon-
sin medical malpractice crisis merely the result of an
orchestrated effort by medical societies throughout this coun-
try to limit the rights of victims on a state-by-state basis? (8)
Are proposals to limit contingent fees intended to curtail the
ability of medical malpractice victims to seek redress for their
injuries? (9) Are the financial circumstances of medical mal-
practice insurance such that the insurers can only survive by
further limiting victims' rights? (10) Is the current statutory
restriction on attorney fees in section 655.013 of the Wiscon-
sin Statutes being abused?
Any thorough investigation into our present system will
reveal areas which could be improved. As attorneys, we are
committed to maintaining justice in a system governing an
ever changing society. The following proposals are designed
to serve this purpose.
I. We propose that doctors who repeatedly commit acts
of malpractice pay higher rated premiums.
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II. We oppose any arbitrary limitations with respect to
the Patient's Compensation Fund that are not proven to be
economically and actuarially essential.
III. We oppose any damage "cap" on the amount an in-
dividual claimant may recover because the innocent victim
and the overburdened taxpayer will thereby be required to
subsidize medical malpractice.
IV. We propose that medical malpractice primary insur-
ance limits be raised to $500,000 per occurrence.
V. We oppose the amendment or repeal of section
655.245 of the Wisconsin Statutes which presently limits the
right of doctors to interfere with settlements.
VI. We propose eliminating the limitation on contingent
fees which currently exists in section 655.013 of the Wisconsin
Statutes, and we oppose any further limitations on contingent
fees.
VII. We propose that hearings at the formal panel level
be bifurcated to provide for both a liability hearing and a dam-
age hearing.
VIII. We propose the repeal of section 655.19(1) of the
Wisconsin Statutes which allows formal panel findings to be
admitted in circuit court actions.
IX. We propose altering the composition of formal
panels to consist of three lay persons, one doctor, and one
lawyer.
X. We propose that formal panels be subject to full voir
dire and challenges for cause.
XI. We oppose frivolous suits, and we believe that frivo-
lous suits, whether before the panel or in the courts, should be
deterred by the fee and costs provisions of section 814.025 of
the Wisconsin Statutes.
XII. We oppose the requirement that settlements over a
specified amount be paid in installments, since such a require-
ment effectively "caps" awards.
XIII. We propose strengthening the conditional immu-
nity provided in section 146.37 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
XIV. We propose that the Wisconsin Medical Examin-
ing Board promptly discipline physicians who are found to
have committed multiple acts of medical malpractice.
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III. ELABORATION ON KEY ISSUES
The issues and proposals that generate the most attention
go to the heart of the relationships between doctors, lawyers,
and medical malpractice victims. These areas need to be un-
derstood before any modification of the present medical mal-
practice dispute resolution system is undertaken. This part of
the Article will discuss: (1) the existence of a "crisis"; (2) the
cost of insurance; (3) modifications concerning award limita-
tions, contingent fees, and the locality rule; and (4) doctors
who repeatedly commit acts of malpractice.
A. The Existence of a Medical Malpractice Crisis
The circumstances and conditions surrounding the alleged
medical negligence crisis of 1975 must be reviewed to under-
stand the situation today. One member of the 1975 Wisconsin
Legislature made the following observation:
I can't help but believe that the "crisis" in Wisconsin
may have been artificially developed. The sudden momen-
tum is highly suspect.
Although the Wisconsin Legislature had, as early as July
of 1974, begun to address the problems relating to malprac-
tice and was proceeding to pass legislation for the benefit of
the medical community, we suddenly found ourselves faced
with a "deadline" imposed by the insurance industry and
medical profession ....
An atmosphere of confusion existed because fundamen-
tal changes in Wisconsin's tort liability system were being
demanded, without providing the Legislature with the data
necessary to evaluate the need for such changes.'
Just as they did in 1975, the Medical Society and the in-
surance industry in 1985 would have the legislature believe
that they are faced with a sudden crisis which threatens the
delivery of medical services in Wisconsin and throughout the
country. In fact, the Medical Society has always reacted to
the concept of medical malpractice with "an unhealthy
paranoia."2
1. Czerwinski, Wisconsin's Medical Malpractice Crisis, A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 55 (D. Warren & R. Merritt, eds. 1976).
2. Ottensmeyer, Contingent Fees in Medical Malpractice Litigation - A Qualitative
Assessment, 139 W.J. MED. 239, 243 (1983).
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Doctors have always resented the very idea of medical
malpractice. 3 Reading through the pages of the Medical Eco-
nomics magazine, one is left with two impressions. First,
prior to 1975, doctors appeared primarily concerned about the
cost of medical malpractice insurance and accordingly focused
their anger with respect to malpractice on the private insur-
ance industry. After 1975, it appears that doctors and the in-
surance industry discovered that they could benefit each other
by coordinating an attack on the alleged "cause" of their med-
ical malpractice problems: the way in which medical mal-
practice disputes are resolved in our legal system. Second, one
gains the impression that doctors and the insurance industry
discovered in 1975 how to manipulate the press and public
opinion so as to create the perception of a medical malpractice
crisis. In so doing, the doctors and the insurance industry dis-
covered that they were able to divert the attention of both the
public and the legislature from the true cause of medical mal-
practice: the failure of the Medical Society and the insurance
industry to identify, discipline, and remove from the profes-
sion those health care providers who through their negligence
cause untold suffering and injury to an unsuspecting public. 4
In fact, just as in 1975, the current efforts of the Medical
Society and insurance industry lobbyists are a part of a na-
tional campaign to convince the public and legislature of each
3. The editors of Medical Economics magazine made the following observation in
October 1983:
With the malpractice crisis of the 1970s still fresh in your memory and the
professional liability situation again heating up, you may think wistfully of a
bygone era when this was a matter of little concern to America's physicians.
You wouldn't find any evidence that such an era ever existed by leafing
through old copies of Medical Economics. W. Clifford Klenk reported in the
March 1934 issue: "Summed up, the doctors' grievances are these: A few com-
panies have a monopoly on the writing of malpractice insurance. . . . Profes-
sional incomes have swooped drastically downward in the last five years while
premium charges have increased. . . . [T]he insurance companies are promot-
ing a racket."
An article two years later sounded this alarm: "Four Thousand Physicians
Sued! And What To Do About It." In the '40s there were more articles about
the growing malpractice threat.
Lavin, Malpractice: A New Storm Is Looming, MED. ECON., October 3, 1983, at 76
(editorial insert at 78).
4. This failure to address the true cause of medical malpractice has recently been
noted in the pages of the Milwaukee Journal See Milwaukee J., Nov. 14, 1984, § 2, at
1, col. 1; id. Nov. 13, 1984, § 1, at 1, col. I.
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state that a medical malpractice crisis exists. In this way, it is
hoped that medical malpractice "reform" can be brought
about in this country on a state-by-state basis.5 The proposed
modifications in Wisconsin's system of medical malpractice
dispute resolution reveal that the real concern of the doctors
and the insurance companies lies in the elimination or signifi-
cant curtailment of the rights of malpractice victims. 6
The Wisconsin Legislature did not face a medical malprac-
tice crisis in 1975; instead, the legislature was confronted by a
public relations creation of the Medical Society and insurance
industry lobbyists. The legislature was pressured into enact-
ing legislation which restricted the rights of victims before the
legislature could calmly and carefully examine the empirical
evidence of the true picture of medical malpractice in
Wisconsin. v
5. It is surprising that Wisconsin doctors have permitted themselves to be swept
along with the current national agitation to further modify malpractice laws. The Med-
ical Society, with the assistance of the insurance industry, succeeded in modifying the
law in Wisconsin in 1975 far more than did their colleagues in other states, and Wiscon-
sin doctors benefited to a very substantial extent from the modifications which they
imposed upon Wisconsin in 1975. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
6. If the legislature permits itself to be used once again by the Medical Society and
the insurance industry, its legislative mandates may be struck down as unconstitutional
in the same way similar mandates have been struck down in other jurisdictions. For
example, Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio courts have held unconsti-
tutional the imposition of monetary limitations on recoveries in medical malpractice
cases. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976).
7. The Wisconsin Legislature was not the only one to fall victim to these scare
tactics. In the State of Indiana, a full investigation was eventually conducted but only
after that state's legislature had been convinced in 1975 to take away valuable rights of
malpractice victims in the crisis atmosphere created by the medical society and insur-
ance industry lobbyists. Indiana placed restrictions on valuable patient rights ostensibly
to decrease the amount of unwarranted recoveries. However, the statistics which were
later revealed showed that insurers of Indiana health care providers were not facing an
actual increase in either the number or amounts of claims.
Health care providers and their insurers claimed that the number of suits and
amounts of awards had seriously increased in Indiana in 1974. However, according to
the annual financial statements filed by the Medical Protective Company and St. Paul
Fire and Marine Insurance Company, the number of suits and amount of awards
against health care providers in Indiana had actually decreased in 1974. See Note, The
Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: Legislative Surgery on Patients' Rights, 10 VAL. U.L.
REv. 303, 342 (1975) (citing J. Dickerson & G. Lodge, Indiana Senate Subcommittee
on Insurance and Corporations (March 21, 1975)). The number of suits filed against
the Medical Protective Company decreased from 658 in 1973 to 137 in 1974. See id. at
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The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) found that medical malpractice insurance was readily
available in 1973.8 Indeed, the HEW found that insurers at
that time had renewed interest in the medical malpractice un-
derwriting field and that some insurance companies were ac-
tively soliciting new malpractice business.9 Yet, the medical
community insisted that insurance was not readily available.
As evidence of the scare and pressure tactics used by the
Medical Society and insurance industry lobbyists in 1975, the
doctors gave the Wisconsin Legislature until July 1, 1975, to
act on the demands of their lobbyists, or else they would stage
a "strike." The Assembly Insurance and Banking Committee
held hearings on the very eve of the July 1, 1975, deadline.
Because of the artificial crisis, that committee was completely
unable to identify and study the empirical evidence relied on
by the doctors and the insurers. Had the legislature been
given the opportunity to carefully review the empirical evi-
dence which was then available, it would have concluded that
there was no medical negligence crisis in 1975.
The empirical evidence presented to the legislature indi-
cated that eighty-seven percent of the claims closed in 1974
were settled before trial and that fifty-three percent of jury
verdicts were in favor of the plaintiff.10 However, the awards
343. During the same period, St. Paul Fire and Marine likewise experienced a decline
in claims from 3,746 to 1,156. See id. And the total amount of damages paid to Indiana
claimants in 1974 was $1.5 million out of $6.7 million collected in premiums. See id. at
337.
Illustrative of the misinformation prevalent during the 1975 "Indiana Crisis" is an
article which appeared in the Bloomington Daily Herald - Telephone. It stated that the
average award in malpractice cases during the period from 1970 to 1975 was reportedly
$282,403. See Bloomington Daily Herald - Telephone, January 14, 1975, at 1. In
direct contrast to this article are the findings published by the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare. In that comprehensive report, it was disclosed that of those
claimants nationwide who received payments, more than half obtained less than $3,000
and only three percent of all claimants received payments in excess of $100,000. See
SECRETARY'S COMMISSION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE RE-
PORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, DHEW Pub. No. (05), at 73-88 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as HEW REPORT].
The California Legislature was also misled during this time period. See Address by
Keene, Annual Meeting of National Conference of State Legislatures (1975), cited in T.
LOMBARDI, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE 110-11 (1975).
8. See HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 38-39.
9. See id. at 38.
10. See Czerwinski, supra note 1, at 54.
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ranged from $300 to $233,500, and there was only one award
over $100,000 in the 146 cases analyzed by the committee in
1975.11 In 1974, 97.3 percent of the Wisconsin claims settled
were for less than $40,000, and the average settlement was
only $8,856 in those cases in which a payment was made to a
claimant. 12 The data also demonstrated that Wisconsin ver-
dicts and settlements were more favorable to physicians than
the national average of $12,500.13
The Medical Society and insurance industry lobbyists did
not achieve all of their objectives during the 1975 crisis cre-
ated by them.'4 After waiting a respectable ten years, the
Medical Society and insurance industry lobbyists have de-
cided, both here and throughout the country, to create an-
other artificial crisis in order to complete the curtailment of
victims' rights begun in 1975. Many of the attempted tort re-
forms, some of which were rejected by the full legislature in
1975,15 have again been put "on the table" by the Medical
Society. Although the suggested reforms are the same, health
care providers are now arguing that due to allegedly excessive
malpractice claims and awards, malpractice insurance premi-
ums are too high and the Wisconsin Patient's Compensation
Fund has been placed in jeopardy.
B. The Cost of Medical Malpractice Insurance
Fundamental to the claim of the medical community that
another crisis is at hand is the underlying premise that the
cost of medical malpractice insurance has become increasingly
excessive. There is no claim that insurance is unavailable,
only unreasonably priced. The only evidence offered by the
State Medical Society in support of this point is the fact that
11. See id.
12. See id. at 54-55.
13. See id. at 55.
14. For example, during the alleged crisis of 1975, the State Medical Society of
Wisconsin asked for various tort reforms. According to Senate Bill 299, which was
passed by the Senate under the great pressure noted previously, recovery for victims of
medical negligence would have been limited to $100,000 for bodily injury, even if 100%
permanent impairment resulted. See 1975 Senate Bill 299 § 8. In cases of death to the
patient, the maximum recovery would have been $100,000 with $5,000 for loss of com-
panionship, plus funeral expenses. See id. The foregoing proposals ultimately were not
enacted into law in 1975. See Czerwinski, supra note 1, at 52-55.
15. See supra note 14.
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the malpractice premiums of physicians have risen in the past
three years.' 6 However, because of inflation, very few goods
and services have not increased in price over the same period
of time.
Statistics suggest that the Medical Society has grossly ex-
aggerated the impact of malpractice premiums in the State of
Wisconsin. According to a recent article in Newsweek, the av-
erage pre-tax net income of all self-employed physicians, at
$115,900, was still growing faster than inflation.17 Expendi-
tures for medical malpractice insurance by self-employed phy-
sicians represent only 3.5 percent of their gross income and
only 8.3 percent of their overhead. 8 Overall prices for physi-
cians' services have been outpacing overall inflation,1 9 and the
proposed increase in medical malpractice insurance premiums
is not based upon a realistic assessment of medical malpractice
claims data.20 Yet, even with the increased cost of medical
16. The legislature should adopt a no-nonsense attitude toward the Medical Society
and the insurance industry concerning their claims that the cost of medical malpractice
insurance may impinge upon the ability of health care providers to deliver reasonably
priced services to the general public. Whenever doctors or insurance carriers are asked
to produce evidence concerning their true incomes and the amount of their malpractice
premiums, they provide a generalized response or no response at all. The legislature
should require the Medical Society to produce detailed evidence demonstrating just how
fast the net incomes of doctors have risen during the past ten years. Both the Medical
Society and the insurance industry should also be required to provide detailed evidence
to the legislature of just what percentage of health care providers' overhead is devoted
to malpractice insurance protection.
17. See Taking a Scalpel to Doctors, NEwswEEK, Jan. 14, 1985, at 58, 59.
18. See id.
19. See id. Similarly, The Wall Street Journal recently reported that medical mal-
practice premium costs represent only one to two percent of all health care costs and
that even the highest premiums only represent about eight percent of a physician's gross
income. See The Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1985, at 12, col. 5-6. Of course, medical mal-
practice premiums are paid from gross, as distinguished from net, income. According
to a survey conducted by the editors of Medical Economics, the average gross income of
all doctors in 1983 was $157,500, while the average gross income of neurosurgeons was
$241,120. See Owens, Are You Still Losing Out to Inflation?, MED. ECON., Sept. 17,
1984, at 181, 185.
The Milwaukee Sentinel recently reported that as of July 1, 1985, when the new
rates go into effect, general practitioners could be paying about $4,000 a year for mal-
practice insurance premiums, a 75% increase. See Milwaukee Sentinel, Jan. 18, 1985,
at 1, col. 1. However, general practitioners in Wisconsin will still be paying only 2.5
percent of their gross incomes for medical malpractice insurance premiums.
20. The 75% fee hike in medical malpractice insurance is the increase in fees for
the Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan which was recommended by the
plan's actuaries. See Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance Plan, Estimated Unpaid
Claim Liabilities 12/31/84, Physicians & Surgeons Experience, at 3, 21 (Nov. 20, 1984)
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malpractice insurance, the expenditures for such insurance
represent only a very small percentage of overhead and a
small percentage of gross income for the general
practitioner.21
The fact is that Wisconsin doctors have benefited finan-
cially to a significant degree from the modifications made in
the law in 1975 as compared to their colleagues nationally.
The Joint Legislative Audit Committee's November 1, 1982,
evaluation of the Wisconsin Health Care Liability Insurance
Plan (WHCLIP) observed:
When WHCLIP was established in 1975, neither the Office
of the Commissioner of Insurance nor the Board of Gover-
nors believed the Plan would develop into Wisconsin's larg-
est medical malpractice insurer. At that time the Insurance
Commissioner's Office believed the Plan would "insure only
the estimated 200-300 doctors unable to obtain coverage in
the voluntary insurance market."
We identified two primary factors which have contrib-
uted to the growth of WHCLIP and make it difficult for pri-
vate insurers to compete with the Plan: a) WHCLIP makes
occurrence coverage available to all licensed Wisconsin
health care providers, and b) between 1975 and 1982 the
Plan's rates decreased by about 69 percent.22
(prepared by Daniel J. Flaherty and Robert L. Sanders). In making this recommenda-
tion, however, the actuaries have ignored long-term trends concerning medical malprac-
tice claims. Although the actuaries recognize that both the frequency and severity of
medical malpractice claims have leveled off and even slowed, see id. at 2, 7, 10, they
base their pricing decisions for the plan upon a "very conservative set of assumptions."
Id. at 21. The claimed justification for this conservative approach is the fact that the
excess premiums can always be refunded if the plan's claims experience is more
favorable than expected. See id. at 3, 21.
21. See supra note 19.
22. Office of the Commissioner of Insurance, The Wisconsin Health Care Liability
Insurance Plan: An Evaluation by the State of Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau [82-
20], Nov. 1982, at 14 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as WHCLIP Report].
Our review of liability insurance in six other midwestern states (Iowa, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, and Ohio) shows that none of these states' gov-
ernments has found it necessary to become as involved in insuring providers as
Wisconsin. . . . However, we do believe that it is significant to note that of the six
states we contacted only one state, Indiana, operates a plan similar to WHCLIP,
but on a much smaller scale.
Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
Of course, WHCLIP is only intended to meet the primary insurance requirements of
doctors in Wisconsin. Nevertheless, the primary insurance needs of doctors constitute a
significant portion of their medical malpractice insurance expense.
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Part of the cost problem is due to the current deficit in the
Patient's Compensation Fund, a result not attributable to law-
yers. The State Medical Society's actuaries have found that
the deficit is the direct result of actuarial miscalculations
made in years past.
The current Fund deficit is the result of fees which, in the
early years of the program, were not sufficient to satisfy ulti-
mate liabilities of the Fund. The current Fund fees were de-
veloped to be actuarially sound, and consequently should be
sufficient to pay the ultimate losses for the 1984-85 Fund
year.23
The legislature should carefully review the current admin-
istration of both WHCLIP and the fund by the Wisconsin In-
surance Commissioner. The Legislative Audit Committee's
evaluation of WHCLIP has already suggested that there is en-
tirely too much state involvement in Wisconsin malpractice
insurance matters, 24 and serious questions are raised by the
evaluation as to whether WHCLIP should be returned to the
competitive marketplace of private insurance companies.
The legislature should also consider the possibility that the
Office of the Insurance Commissioner has not properly admin-
istered the fund. It does not appear that medical malpractice
premiums in the private marketplace have been rising at a
particularly alarming rate throughout the rest of the
country.26
23. Letter from actuary Gary Josephson to Legislative Council Staff Attorney Pam
Russell (Sept. 14, 1984). The fund deficit is not a function of the frequency and severity
of claims. Claims are only as frequent and severe as the injuries caused by malpractice.
Fund deficits can and should be controlled by the adoption of proper actuarial and
underwriting standards and practices.
Instead of increasing malpractice premiums or adjusting primary or excess coverage
limits (several of the options recommended by the Medical Society's own actuaries), the
Medical Society would have the legislature eliminate the current fund deficit and con-
trol future deficits at the expense of the rights of medical malpractice victims.
24. See WHCLIP Report, supra note 22, at 14, 28-34.
25. See id. at 28-34.
26. What's worse, most of the pros feel that premiums in some states - New
York particularly - are unrealistically deflated, partly to be competitive and
partly because insurance regulators have held them down. . ..
Insurers stress that for the most part, rate hikes in the 1980s have been more
modest than in the 1970s.
Lavin, supra note 3, at 93.
1985]
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Moreover, instead of sacrificing the rights of malpractice
victims, even if a fund deficit exists which is not attributable
solely to improper actuarial computations on the part of the
Insurance Commissioner, greater emphasis should be placed
on loss prevention 27 and the elimination of negligent health
care providers from practice. The legislature should require
the Medical Society and the insurance industry to demon-
strate that they have done everything in their power to elimi-
nate negligent health care providers before the rights of
innocent victims of malpractice are placed in further jeopardy
by needless revisions in the medical malpractice dispute reso-
lution system in Wisconsin.28
C. Proposed Modifications of the Existing Malpractice
Dispute Resolution System.
The Medical Society has proposed a number of modifica-
tions to the existing malpractice dispute resolution system
which are now the focus of the latest scare and pressure tac-
tics of the Medical Society and insurance industry lobbyists.
The proposed modifications include limitations on awards to
victims of malpractice and limitations on fees paid to the at-
torneys of those victims. Additionally, it has been suggested
that Wisconsin reinstate the so-called "locality rule."
1. Award limitations
The Medical Society argues that three different types of
limitations should be placed upon awards to victims of medi-
cal negligence. 29 First, the Medical Society proposes an abso-
27. "The insurance insiders point, however, to several major factors that could mit-
igate a [malpractice] crisis - state legislative reform, competition in the industry, and,
perhaps most important, strong emphasis on loss prevention and risk management."
Id. at 76.
28. Another possible solution to the fund deficit might be the establishment of
health care institution self-insurance programs. These programs have received a great
deal of attention recently in medical literature. See, e.g., McGovern, Medical Profes-
sional Liability, Topics IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING, spring 1983, at 27.
29. Dr. Robert Condon recently wrote:
Should we seek legislation to limit awards? I think it is not likely to be success-
ful and, even if we succeeded, would have very little impact on the malpractice
problem. The American Medical Association in its 1983 report of public opin-
ion suggested that 61 percent of the public supported limitations on malpractice
awards. However, the 1983 Public Attitude Survey conducted by the All-Indus-
try Research Advisory Council came to an opposite conclusion. Only 27 percent
[Vol. 68:259
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lute cap of $1,000,000. Second, the Medical Society proposes
a $100,000 limit on the amount the fund is required to pay on
any one claim in any one year.30 And third, the Medical Soci-
ety proposes a $100,000 cap on non-economic damages -
pain, suffering, disability, and diminution in the victim's abil-
ity to enjoy life.
These award limitations are contrary to fundamental fair-
ness because they leave victims grossly uncompensated. They
would be arbitrarily imposed, regardless of the amount of ex-
pense the victim must incur for medical care to treat the con-
dition created or aggravated by the act of malpractice,
regardless of the magnitude of the past or future wage loss,
and regardless of how pervasive or how chronic the pain, suf-
fering, and disability of the victim. 31
of the respondents to that poll indicated that limiting malpractice awards was a
good idea.
Condon, The Malpractice Problem: A Surgeon's Viewpoint, 83 WIs. MED. J. 9, 14 (Oct.
1984).
30. If the ultimate liability of the fund is to be restricted to some certain dollar
amount, why should health care providers not be required to obtain private excess lia-
bility insurance umbrellas? The cost of these excess liability umbrellas would not con-
tribute significantly to the overhead expense of health care providers.
31. The insidious nature of these proposals is illustrated by the following hypotheti-
cal scenario. The Jones' one year-old daughter develops meningitis. Through the negli-
gence of the family physician, the infection goes unchecked; a one year-old girl is
rendered a spastic quadraparetic, but is left with a normal intelligence quotient (I.Q.).
In other words, she cannot control her arms or legs; she cannot engage in functional
speech; she has an enormous experience deficit which contributes to developmental and
cognitive delays and now requires care twenty-four hours a day.
Through the testimony of an ergonomist (human factors engineer), it is possible to
determine the amount it will cost to provide wheelchair access, physical and occupa-
tional therapy, medical and therapy equipment, environmental control, live-in aides,
dental and medical goods and services, and other necessities. The price tags on these
items, together with the necessary augmentative communication equipment to aid in
human interaction and educational development, typically will exceed $2,000,000. Add
to this figure the fair and reasonable compensation to the girl who had a lifetime ahead
of her, and to the parents who must now provide extraordinary care for their daughter
24 hours a day for the next 17 years. Taking into account the anxiety and mental
suffering of the victim and the change in the relationship between the parents and child,
experience suggests a non-economic loss award in excess of $1,000,000. Thus, the total
award would probably be $3,000,000.
Now consider the effect of each of the three award limitations proposed by the Med-
ical Society. First, if the total limit on claims were set at $1,000,000, the Jones family's
award would be reduced to $1,000,000, which is one-third of the probable value of their
claim and only 50% of the total of the necessary out-of-pocket expenses. Under this
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As with most of the proposals by the Medical Society
aimed at restricting patients' rights, there is no empirical data
available which would support the contention that such re-
strictions will save substantial dollars. In fact, the savings
would be insignificant when compared to the injustice done to
the injured parties. An analysis of what has occurred because
of the cap imposed on wrongful death recoveries for loss of
society and companionship is instructive. In a recent Milwau-
kee Journal article, the ramifications of Wisconsin's wrongful
death statute were explored: "Wisconsin attorneys reject doz-
ens of wrongful death cases each year, because it would cost
more to try the cases than the families could receive in re-
turn. 3 2 Similarly, limitations on medical malpractice damage
recoveries are against public policy because they will inhibit
the vigorous prosecution of meritorious claims.
proposal, the non-economic losses would be totally uncompensated because the out-of-
pocket expenses exceed the proposed limitations on claims.
Compensation for all of the pain, suffering, and disability of the family of this girl is
limited to $100,000 under the Medical Society's proposal. This girl, who would have
walked, run, jumped, and played with her siblings, friends, and schoolmates; who would
have raised her voice in song; whose body is now, as a result of the medical negligence,
racked with spastic paralysis; who would have experienced with her family the miracle
of human growth to independence, now requires care 24 hours a day. Someone must
bathe her, brush her teeth, dress her, and change her diapers - now and forever. The
family excursions and vacations must always be altered to take into account her limited
abilities and special access needs.
Live-in help becomes a part of the Jones' everyday existence, and the intimacy of
family life is compromised. Special schools, special teachers, and special transportation
must be provided. Always there is the mental suffering as the girl watches children her
age and younger quickly advance beyond her abilities. They walk, they run, they roll in
the grass; they jump rope, they play ball and laugh; the Jones girl can only sit and watch
and wonder. For all of this and much more the Medical Society proposes a total award
of $100,000. For the physical and mental pain and suffering, the incredible diminution
in the ability to enjoy life, the anxiety, the change in the relationship between the family
members, the incredible physical restrictions and for what the future holds for this girl's
life, the Medical Society proposes that the fair and reasonable compensation be limited
to $100,000.
Finally, the Medical Society proposes that the Patient's Compensation Fund be obli-
gated to pay no more than $100,000 per year on any claim. Since damage awards earn
12% interest by statute, an award of SI,000,000 would produce $120,000 per year. This
is more than enough to satisfy the fund's obligation under the Medical Society's propo-
sal. Under the Society's proposal the victim would never receive any of the principal of
the award; it would remain in the fund's control. The proposal would not only deprive
the victim of the use of the principal sum, but also nullify an award of compensation to
the victim. The claimant would be paid $100,000 per year in taxable interest income
and never a dime of the principal sum.
32. Milwaukee J., Dec. 15, 1983, § 2, at 4, col. 1.
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The recovery limitations proposed by the Medical Society
are also unconstitutional. Damage limitations constitute a de-
nial of a tort victim's constitutional right to have damages de-
termined in a trial by jury. The right to a trial by jury is
guaranteed to our citizens in both the United States33 and
Wisconsin Constitutions.34
The Medical Society's proposal to limit damage awards in
medical malpractice actions is directly contrary to a long line
of judicial decisions which clearly establish the jury as the ap-
propriate body to determine damages in tort actions.35  The
unfairness of the Medical Society's proposal to limit the
amount of damages a victim may receive is obvious. Just as
troubling, however, is the fact that the Medical Society's pro-
posal is clearly an effort to deny malpractice victims their
right to a trial by jury.36
2. Restrictions on contingent fees
Whenever special interest groups want to deny consumers
the "key to the courthouse," they attack the contingent fee
contract. The attackers are invariably the opponents of, and
never the clients of, contingent fee lawyers. Insurance compa-
33. The seventh amendment provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
34. The pertinent provision provides in part: "The right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in
controversy .... " WIS. CONST. art. I, § 5.
35. See, e.g., Toulon v. Nagle, 67 Wis. 2d 233, 245, 226 N.W.2d 480, 487 (1975)
(citing Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927)).
36. The constitutional infirmity of the Medical Society's damage limitation propos-
als exists regardless of the fact that these cases would still be decided by a jury. The
infringement upon a major function of the jury is no less unconstitutional because it is
indirect, instead of direct. The practical effect of the proposed damage limitation is to
establish an irrefutable presumption that persons injured by medical negligence can
never experience losses in excess of $1,000,000. This clearly is unconstitutional. The
Medical Society is in effect attempting to embarrass the legislature by compelling the
enactment of damage limitations which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has already sug-
gested cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. Cf. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81
Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). It must be remembered that the courts in Illinois,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio have all held the imposition of monetary




nies and doctors can afford to pay lawyers by the hour. Most
victims of negligence cannot. Those who are injured most se-
verely, those who have had their ability to earn a living de-
stroyed, are the ones who can least afford legal services and, at
the same time, are the ones who need it most. It is these peo-
ple in particular who have been targeted by the State Medical
Society in its most recent attempt to dispose of the "key to the
courthouse."
During the alleged medical negligence crisis of 1975, the
contingent fee system was the subject of considerable criti-
cism. Health care providers maintained that greedy attorneys,
hungry for fat contingent fees, generated suits that would not
otherwise have been brought, thus driving up the number of
claims against them and making the health care providers less
insurable risks. The providers further appeared to resent the
fact that in those cases in which the victim prevailed, thirty-
three to forty percent of the award went to the plaintiffs attor-
ney. In fact, the desire to limit contingent fees is an attempt
by the Medical Society and insurance industry lobbyists to re-
duce the number of malpractice claims by minimizing the
margin of profit for plaintiffs' attorneys. In so doing, it is
hoped that plaintiffs' attorneys will be less willing to handle
malpractice suits.
This hope would no doubt materialize into fact. The pro-
posed legislation to limit contingent fees would decrease the
number of claims brought because it will increase the number
of cases which plaintiffs' lawyers will not handle.37 However,
it will do so at the expense of those persons who have the
greatest need for a remedy.38
37. In a study conducted by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice, it
was estimated:
Imposition of limits on contingent fees charged by plaintiffs' attorneys seemed
to:
Cut the average settlement by 9%.
Raise the portion of cases dropped from 43% to 48%.
Reduce the share of cases going to verdict from 6.1% to 4.6%.
P. DANZON & L. LILLARD, THE RESOLUTION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS 26
(1982) (published by the Institute for Civil Justice of the Rand Corp.) [hereinafter cited
as Rand Study]. This evidence is from an independent research organization which
does not represent medical doctors, insurance companies, or plaintiffs' attorneys.
38. The HEW Report revealed that contingent fee attorneys declined to handle
suits involving smaller claims, whether meritorious or not, because they are not profita-
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As to those cases which are commenced, limiting contin-
gent fees will place plaintiffs' counsel at a disadvantage vis-a-
vis defense counsel. Without corresponding limitations on de-
fense fee arrangements,3 9 defense attorneys will be able to ex-
pend more time and effort on trial preparation than plaintiffs'
counsel. As a result, the defense will be better prepared.
Another assertion, never supported by evidence, is that the
contingent fee system promotes frivolous lawsuits. Logic says
otherwise. If a frivolous suit is one which has no basis, then it
is one which will be lost and one which will generate no fee for
the claimant's lawyer. There is no greater incentive for a law-
yer to separate good cases from bad than the contingent fee
system since attorneys are not paid unless they prevail.40  In-
stead of eliminating frivolous claims, limiting contingent fees
will reduce meritorious malpractice litigation by reducing the
cost effectiveness of such litigation.
The Medical Society has alternatively asserted that the
contingent fee should be graduated in such a way that the per-
ble. See HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 32-33. Furthermore, the HEWReport suggests
that since a fee is not forthcoming when a suit is unsuccessful, the time, expense, and
effort involved in such cases force attorneys to separate the cases involving questionable
liability from those in which the medical negligence is more apparent. See id. at 33.
Limiting contingent fees would have the effect of depriving seriously injured poor peo-
ple of the competent counsel they must have to successfully prosecute claims against
well-defended insurers. According to the Rand Study, any significant restriction on
contingent fees will result in a 48% increase in rejected cases. See Rand Study, supra
note 37, at 26. "About half of the claims dropped would have produced an award for
the plaintiff if taken to verdict." Id. at 19.
39. The HEW Report found that total fees earned by plaintiffs' lawyers in ordinary
tort litigation were comparable to the hourly fees paid to defense attorneys. See HEW
REPORT, supra note 7, at 33. Unlike ordinary tort litigation, Chapter 655 of the Wis-
consin Statutes provides a two-tier trial system. Accordingly, it follows that many more
hours are required to fully litigate a case under Chapter 655 than in ordinary tort litiga-
tion. The increased preparation and litigation time presents no problem to defense
counsel, who are paid by the hour. On the other hand, Chapter 655 naturally works to
reduce the cost effectiveness of plaintiffs' litigation. If contingent fees were restricted
with no similar restriction on defense fees, the system would unfairly discriminate based
on the wealth of the parties.
In the HEW Report, it was discovered that "the average number of plaintiff-lawyer
hours spent on zero recovery litigated cases is 440 hours per case." Id. If one assumes a
$100 hourly rate, then the average plaintiff's attorney invests at least $44,000 in fees in
zero recovery cases. This does not take into account the well-known expert witness fees
advanced by plaintiff's counsel in payment to medical doctors for testifying in medical
negligence cases. These expert fees regularly exceed $20,000 and often reach $100,000
or more per case.
40. See id. at 32-33.
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centage of the fee earned would decrease as the recovery in-
creases. Even members of the medical profession have
acknowledged the absurdity and the danger of this proposal.
According to Dr. David J. Ottensmeyer:
If contingent fees progressively decline as a percentage of the
recovery further conflict between lawyer and client is possible.
Does the possible additional recovery for a client require a
disproportionate amount of additional effort that is not mar-
ginally beneficial for the lawyer? Also because such a fee is
payable without regard to time spent on the case by a law-
yer, it may be to the lawyer's advantage (however unethical)
to settle it quickly and on terms that are not in the best inter-
ests of the client.4'
3. The locality rule
The Medical Society has asked the legislature to reinstate
the discarded rule of law called "the locality rule." This rule
required a patient to call an expert witness who not only prac-
ticed the same specialty as the defendant doctor, but practiced
it in the same community. Patients were thus forced to pro-
duce testimony from those who were most reluctant to testify:
colleagues and friends. What resulted was the "conspiracy of
silence."
The Medical Society overlooks the fact that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court abolished the locality rule in 1973.42 The
Medical Society would now have the legislature overrule the
carefully reasoned decision of our supreme court that permits
a plaintiff to establish the standard of care and breach thereof
through evidence of the standard of care of the average practi-
tioner of the class to which the defendant belongs, without
regard to community. In abolishing the locality rule, the
supreme court relied on a survey done by the Stanford Law
Review and the Stanford University School of Medicine.43
The supreme court reported that the results of the survey con-
41. Ottensmeyer, supra note 2, at 241 (emphasis added).
42. See Shier v. Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973).
43. See id. at 282, 206 N.W.2d at 173. Among those queried in connection with the
preparation of that survey were the American Medical Association, the American Hos-
pital Association, the American Specialty Boards, medical speciality societies, and pub-
lishers of medical specialty journals. The purpose of the survey was to determine the




firmed the obvious: there was no basis in fact for the locality
rule.4
Nothing has changed since 1973 which would justify the
legislature in overturning the well-researched and well-rea-
soned decision of our Wisconsin Supreme Court. The locality
rule is, and should remain, history.
D. Doctors Who Repeatedly Commit Acts of Malpractice
One of the principal problems existing in the State of Wis-
consin is that perpetrators of multiple acts of medical negli-
gence are permitted to continue practicing without censure or
limitation. Further, neither the Medical Society nor the Com-
missioner of Insurance has taken any steps to surcharge these
repeat offenders so that their premiums reflect the risk they
create, and neither the Medical Society nor the Commissioner
of Insurance has in the last nine years attempted to rid the
profession of those doctors who continually commit acts of
malpractice.
The failure to discipline doctors who continually commit
acts of malpractice is one of the primary reasons for increased
malpractice litigation and insurance premiums." We suggest
the legislature investigate curbing the problem of repeat of-
fenders rather than curbing the rights of innocent patients.
IV. CONCLUSION
Restricting the rights of victims or penalizing their attor-
neys in order to curb an alleged medical malpractice crisis
makes as much sense as fining victims of reported crime in
order to curb crime. The legislature is now on the verge of
facing another artificial crisis created by the Medical Society
and insurance industry lobbyists. We urge the legislature to
resist the pressure and scare tactics of those lobbyists and to
carefully weigh all of the evidence before considering any fur-
ther modifications to our Wisconsin malpractice dispute reso-
lution system.
44. See id. at 280-83, 206 N.W.2d at 171-73.
45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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